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ABSTRACT
Weak incentives to invest in shareholder oversight and limited resources
confine stewardship by large institutional investors. According to an
influential argument, activist shareholders can offer a solution by supplying
large investment (asset) managers with company-specific information. This
article questions the potential informational role of traditional activist
campaigns initiated by hedge funds – the most prominent group of activist
shareholders – for the purposes of stewardship by large institutional
investors by showing that these two groups of shareholders have different
visions of stewardship with little scope for interactions. Consistent with this
argument, data from the FTSE 350 companies, the UK’s largest listed firms,
show that associations between activist demands and the voting behaviour
of top investment managers vary based on activist types and demand topics.
Demands initiated by hedge funds and on business and operating matters
receive less support. These findings have important implications for
shareholder stewardship and for corporate law reform.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 24 May 2021; Accepted 5 October 2021
KEYWORDS Corporate governance; shareholder stewardship; voting; institutional investors;
shareholder activism
1. Introduction
The impressive growth of shareholdings controlled by a small number of
large fund families and the expansion of corporate governance recommen-
dations from the predominantly board-centric focus towards the recognition
of the significance of shareholder monitoring, voting, and engagement have
reinforced the role of shareholder stewardship as one of the pillars of an
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effectively functioning corporate governance framework. But doubts over the
incentives and the ability of large institutional investors to be effective
company stewards pose serious questions for the concept of shareholder
stewardship. In a series of influential articles, Professor Lucian Bebchuk and
his co-authors discuss weak incentives of these investors to be responsible
shareholders.1 Furthermore, limited resources of large investment (asset)
managers impose natural limits on the exercise of stewardship even where
incentives are not affected. Because of the scale of investments – the
largest fund families control shareholdings in hundreds of firms in different
countries – they tend to promote standard governance measures, which
can be applied on an industry-wide basis across many companies, rather
than focusing on firm-specific performance and operational matters.2 Conse-
quently, investment managers rarely oppose decisions proposed by corpor-
ate managers.3 Experts question the value added by some governance
proposals, as well as the reasonableness of blind application of governance
best standards across all companies,4 and go as far as to propose limiting
or eliminating altogether voting rights of index funds – a leading, if not the
most powerful, group among institutional investors.5
These criticisms strike at the very heart of the value of shareholder stew-
ardship.6 But an influential argument that interactions between institutional
investors and activist shareholders can encourage diversified investors to
become more involved in stewardship suggests that the concerns may be
overstated. In the real world, stewardship decisions are not made in isolation.
Individual monitoring, voting, and engagement decisions are influenced by
the expected behaviour of peers and interactions between different share-
holders.7 This has an important implication: the involvement of skilled
1Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst, ‘The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors’ (2017)
31 J Econ Persp 89, 96–97; Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, ‘Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy’ (2019) 119 Colum L Rev 2029, 2050–71.
2Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley, and Donald B. Keim, ‘Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners’ (2016) 121 J
Fin Econ 111, 134; Suren Gomtsian, ‘Voting Engagement by Large Institutional Investors’ (2020) 45 J
Corp L 659, 704–06.
3Proxy Insight & IHS Markit, 2020 Global Shareholder Voting Review 5 (2020), https://www.proxyinsight.
com/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2020/12/Proxy-Voting-Annual-Review.pdf (showing that most
of the top investment managers support management proposals in more than 90% of cases).
4Dorothy S. Lund, ‘The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting’ (2018) 43 J Corp L 493.
5Lund, n 4 above, at 524–25, 528–30; M. Todd Henderson and Dorothy Shapiro Lund, ‘Index Funds Are
Great for Investors, Risky for Corporate Governance’ Wall St J (23 June 2017), A15; Bernard S. Sharfman,
‘Mutual Fund Advisors’ “Empty Voting” Raises New Governance Issues’ CLS Blue Sky Blog (3 July 2017),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/03/mutual-fund-advisors-empty-voting-raises-new-
governance-issues/; Dick Weil, ‘Passive Investors, Don’t Vote’ Wall St J (9 March 2018), at A15.
6This article refers to stewardship as an umbrella term for three activities: monitoring, voting, and
engagement. See Bebchuk and Hirst, n 1 above, at 2044–46.
7Luca Enriques and Alessandro Romano, ‘Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A Network Theory Per-
spective’ (2019) U Illinois L Rev 223, 225–27; Andrew Carrothers, ‘Friends or Foes? Activist hedge Funds
and Other Institutional Investors’ (2017) 3 (17) Econ & Bus Rev 38, 39. The empirical evidence confirms
that peer behaviour and interactions between institutional investors shape their voting decisions. See
Gregor Matvos and Michael Ostrovsky, ‘Heterogeneity and Peer Effects in Mutual Fund Proxy Voting’
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activists is expected to inform other shareholders which can free ride on infor-
mation discovery efforts of activists to improve their own stewardship prac-
tices by making better informed decisions.8 Professors Ronald Gilson and
Jeffrey Gordon call large institutional investors ‘latent’ activists who are
ready to be proactive stewards of portfolio companies but need someone
like hedge fund activists to supply expert evidence that will assist in
making informed decisions.9 Moreover, stewardship interactions can also
promote the long-term value of proposals by activist hedge funds which
need to align their proposals with the priorities of other investors to
receive broader support.10
The fundamental question then is whether large investment managers
have incentives to work with activist shareholders and whether such inter-
action does indeed take place in practice. To date, the literature has mostly
dealt with the analysis of the benefits of hypothetical interactions between
large investment managers and activist shareholders without considering
comprehensively the incentives of investment managers for such inter-
actions.11 There is also little empirical evidence, beyond some anecdotes,
on real life interactions between large investment managers on one side
and hedge fund activists on the other. Finally, regulatory efforts to strengthen
shareholder stewardship wrestle with the challenge of whether stewardship
by institutional investors may be all-inclusive and replace many forms of acti-
vism in the future. This article addresses the question of possible interactions
between institutional investors and activist shareholders by showing that
large investment managers are unlikely to exploit information supplied by
most activists for stewardship purposes and uses the UK as a case study to
offer empirical evidence largely supporting this prediction. The findings
offer a better understanding of shareholder stewardship in publicly traded
firms and of the stewardship role of different groups of shareholders.
(2010) 98 J Fin Econ 90, 97–100 (showing that funds are more likely to vote against management when
other funds are more likely to vote against management); Alane D. Crane, Andrew Koch, and Sébastien
Michenaud, ‘Institutional Investor Cliques and Governance’ (2019) 133 J Fin Econ 175, 181–82 (showing
that investors with connections within a network vote similarly).
8John Pound, ‘Raiders, Targets, and Politics: The History and Future of American Corporate Control’
(1992) 5 J Applied Corp Fin 6, 16; Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights’ (2013) 113 Colum L
Rev 863, 897–98.
9Gilson and Gordon, n 8 above, at 895; Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Agency Capitalism:
Further Implications of Equity Intermediation’ in Jennifer G. Hill and Randall S. Thomas (eds) Research
Handbook on Shareholder Power (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) 32.
10Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, ‘Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control’
(2007) 155 U Pa L Rev 1021, 1088–89; Gilson and Gordon, n 8 above, at 897–99; Giovanni Strampelli,
‘Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences of Passive Investing’
(2018) 55 San Diego L Rev 803, 840; Anna L. Christie, ‘The New Hedge Fund Activism: Activist Directors
and the Market for Corporate Quasi-Control’ (2019) 19 J Corp L Stud 1, 34; Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey
N. Gordon, ‘The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of Shareholder Activists in Making It Work’
(2019) 31 J Applied Corp Fin 7, 16.
11See nn 8–10 above.
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Section 2 deals with the theoretical framework of interactions between
large investment managers and hedge fund activists, and puts forward this
article’s main argument: large investment managers and hedge fund activists
have different visions of stewardship with little overlaps and, accordingly,
there is limited scope for complementary interactions between them. Corpor-
ate law’s division of powers between shareholders and corporate boards and
the incentives of diversified investors to direct their stewardship efforts
towards matters that can reduce systematic market risks confine stewardship
by large investment managers to efforts on improving the standards of board
governance and on sustainability. This reduces the likelihood of offering
broad support to traditional activist demands targeting business and operat-
ing matters, even though working with activists on those matters could
expand the scope of their stewardship efforts beyond the current prioritisa-
tion of governance and sustainability themes.
Sections 3 and 4 test empirically the predictions derived from the analysis
of interactions between large investment managers and hedge funds using
evidence from UK companies. The UK offers an attractive institutional frame-
work for studying interactions between large investment managers and acti-
vist shareholders. The dominant shareholders of publicly traded companies in
the country are institutional investors of both national and foreign (especially
US) origin and with different investment strategies, offering rich scope for
potential variation in stewardship visions.12 Britain has also a vibrant environ-
ment for activist shareholders with one of the highest number of activist cam-
paigns – often initiated by US hedge funds – outside the United States.13
Importantly, though the hypothesis on the catalyst role of activists was orig-
inally proposed in the US literature,14 many activists and institutional inves-
tors involved with UK firms are from the USA.15 This suggests that the
interplay between investors and activists may be similar in other countries,
especially in the United States. The findings are thus relevant for other
countries with similar institutional investor dominated corporate ownership
structures and a dynamic setting for activist shareholders. Furthermore, the
UK has been a first mover in encouraging investor stewardship by throwing
the support of policy makers behind the efforts of institutional investors to be
active in monitoring, voting, and engagement.16 British experience on
12Suren Gomtsian, ‘Shareholder Engagement and Voting in the United Kingdom’ in Harpreet Kaur et al
(eds) Cambridge Handbook of Comparative Shareholder Engagement and Voting in Major Markets (Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021 forthcoming) 7–14.
13Section 3.2 below.
14See nn 8–9 above.
15Section 3.2 below.
16The United Kingdom was the first country to publish a stewardship code offering a set of best practice
recommendations for shareholders in publicly traded companies in 2010. See Financial Reporting
Council, The UK Stewardship Code (July 2010), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e223e152-
5515-4cdc-a951-da33e093eb28/UK-Stewardship-Code-July-2010.pdf. Generally, British policy makers
have taken a distinctively positive approach towards growing shareholder power and engagement
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interactions between institutional investors and activists can thus be appli-
cable to other countries that follow the path of building a supportive frame-
work for shareholder stewardship.
Empirical results support the argument on different visions of steward-
ship and add more detail and nuances to the existing literature. Consistent
with the argument about different visions of stewardship, voting opposi-
tion to corporate managers differs based on the identity of the activist
shareholder. Particularly, top investment managers are more likely to
oppose management voting recommendations in companies targeted by
activist demands initiated by their peers, i.e. other investment fund man-
agers. But hedge fund activists receive less support; to the contrary, the
presence of a hedge fund activist may even strengthen the alignment of
large investment managers with corporate management during voting.
Voting patterns of top investment managers also differ by demand topic.
Investors are more likely to support governance activism, consistent with
the expectation and evidence that many large investment managers
specialise in governance monitoring.17 At the same time, large investment
managers tend to oppose balance sheet, board related, business strategy,
and M&A activism, which casts doubts on the ability of hedge fund acti-
vists to broaden the scope of the stewardship efforts of large fund families
by supplying them with information on firm-specific operating and
business matters.
The article makes several important and original contributions to the lit-
erature. Most importantly, the study contributes to broad corporate govern-
ance and shareholder stewardship literature by offering theoretical
background and practical evidence on the stewardship role that large fund
groups envision for themselves and on their interactions with activist share-
holders. The study shows that and explains why large investment managers
see their stewardship role limited to governance and sustainability matters.
The findings also pose questions for the influential agency cost framework
of stewardship. On one hand, it does not cost an investor much to vote
against management where most of the information gathering and analysis
costs have already been incurred by an activist shareholder. That many
investment managers are not receptive to activist demands means that
inadequate stewardship resources do not explain fully their voting and
engagement decisions. On the other hand, if conflicts of interests discourage
stewardship by asset managers, then it is not clear why opposition to man-
agement recommendations in activist targeted companies varies by
demand topic, activist type, and across different asset managers. Instead,
and implemented supportive reforms. See Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of Inter-
national Stewardship Codes’ (2018) 41 Seattle U L Rev 497, 503–05.
17Appel et al, n 2 above, at 134; Gomtsian, n 2 above, at 704–06.
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the findings suggest that investment managers may have reservations over
the value created by some activist demands or may view their own role as
limited to stewardship over a narrow range of governance and sustainability
matters. Business and operational matters, meanwhile, are perceived to be
the domain of the board of directors.
The study also offers important implications for corporate law reform
(Section 5). The finding that large institutional investors and hedge fund acti-
vists have differing stewardship domains with different priority topics means
that the two groups of shareholders cannot replace each other in steward-
ship. They are not perfect complements either. Accordingly, regulatory
efforts to strengthen shareholder stewardship should not dismiss any of
the two groups and should not focus on one only, as this is likely to result
in partial monitoring of corporate activities by shareholders. To ensure
balanced and comprehensive shareholder stewardship, both institutional
investors and activist shareholders need stronger encouragement to
perform their respective stewardship roles.
Before moving forward, two limitations of this study must be noted. First,
the study covers voting records of the largest fund groups. Although those
are the most powerful investors, they are certainly not representative of
the entire investor population. Ryan Bubb and Emiliano Catan use voting
data from US mutual funds to show three different clusters of fund groups
and their advisers.18 Most of the largest investors in terms of assets under
management tend to rely on the traditional governance model where the
board of directors is responsible for managing corporate affairs.19 Less diver-
sified investors, consistent with the argument on different visions of steward-
ship, are likely to support stronger firm-specific activist demands. Second, this
study looks only at the voting aspect of stewardship using a relatively small
sample of activist demands targeting the FTSE 350 companies. Investors cer-
tainly engage with their portfolio companies also through private meetings.
Possibly, the range of matters discussed during those meetings is broad.
Whether private engagement is governance focused as well or also covers
business matters falls outside this study’s scope.
2. Institutional background
2.1. The potential informational role of activist shareholders in
shareholder stewardship
Active shareholder stewardship, although being in the collective interests of
shareholders, is not always guaranteed. According to the agency cost theory,
18Ryan Bubb and Emiliano Catan, ‘The Party Structure of Mutual Funds’ (2020) European Corporate Gov-
ernance Institute, Law Working Paper No. 560/2020, 14–15, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124039.
19ibid at 21–22, 30.
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investment managers in large fund groups – especially with predominantly
passive index tracking strategies – lack incentives to be proactive stewards
of portfolio firms.20 Furthermore, finite organisational capabilities of diver-
sified fund groups constrain their stewardship efforts to a limited number
of matters – like corporate governance best practices – that are similar
across portfolio firms, thereby leaving tailored firm-specific voting and
engagement over business matters and operating performance outside the
scope of stewardship.21
According to an influential proposition in academic literature, the sol-
ution to the problems of stewardship by large investment managers
comes from activist shareholders. As originally predicted by John
Pound22 and developed further by Professors Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey
Gordon,23 the role of activist shareholders in the ownership model domi-
nated by diversified institutional investors may be that of an information
agent who can strengthen stewardship efforts of a wider group of share-
holders. This role includes identifying firms with operational inefficiencies,
designing recommendations for correcting these inefficiencies, and
drawing the attention of managers and shareholders to the problem
and the proposed solution. Activists assist large investment managers in
identifying the firms where they need to concentrate limited stewardship
resources and in deciding how to use their voting power. Accordingly,
Professors Gilson and Gordon call activists ‘information intermediaries’
who make governance markets more complete by strengthening rights
that are otherwise not valuable to large institutional investors.24
Prominent among activist shareholders are activist hedge funds – influen-
tial and highly specialised repeat players with engagement efforts that stra-
tegically target primarily business matters and operating performance.25
Whereas large investment managers may be apathetic towards effective
shareholder stewardship on a broad range of themes tailored to the
specific needs of firms, activist hedge funds have incentives to obtain high
quality firm-specific information and attract the attention of large investment
managers to business and operational matters.26
20Gilson and Gordon, n 8 above, at 890; Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas, and Robert B. Thompson,
‘Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism’ (2014) 87 S Cal L Rev 1359, 1392–93; Lund, n
4 above, at 511–12; Bebchuk et al, n 1 above, at 96–98, 102.
21Bernard S. Black, ‘Shareholder Passivity Reexamined’ (1990) 89 Mich L Rev 520, 589; Kahan and Rock, n
10 above, at 1048; Gilson and Gordon, n 8 above, at 889.
22Pound, n 8 above, at 16.
23Gilson and Gordon, n 8 above, at 897–98.
24Gilson and Gordon, n 10 above, at 9.
25Kahan and Rock, n 10 above, at 1028; William W. Bratton, ‘Hedge Funds and Governance Targets’
(2007) 96 Geo LJ 1375, 1382–85; Dionysia Katelouzou, ‘Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism: Dimensions
and Legal Determinants’ (2015) 17 U Pa J Bus L 789, 797–802.
26Kahan and Rock, n 10 above, at 1069; Brian R. Cheffins and John Armour, ‘The Past, Present, and Future
of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds’ (2011) 37 J Corp L 51, 56–57.
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2.2. Different stewardship visions of activist hedge funds and large
investment managers
The argument that activist shareholders are information agents supplying
detailed firm-specific information to other shareholders – most importantly,
to influential investment managers – assumes that different groups of share-
holders have overlapping stewardship preferences. Activist shareholders
could act as information intermediaries and broaden the scope of steward-
ship efforts of investment managers if the dominant reason for their passivity
was the scarcity of stewardship resources. But this is only one of the reasons
of the limited stewardship focus of large investment managers. Their stew-
ardship vision is also shaped by other reasons that cannot be changed by
activists. As explained next, several factors influence stewardship preferences
of large investment managers, leading to a stewardship vision that does not
encompass the traditional demand topics of activist hedge funds. Conse-
quently, the informational role of activists is limited in practice.
The first factor to consider is corporate law’s long-standing division of
powers between shareholders and the board of directors. Corporate law tra-
ditionally requires publicly traded firms to have a centralised management
structure separate from shareholders.27 Shareholders retain only a limited
range of powers and delegate all other matters, including the management
of the business and affairs of the company and setting its business strategy,
to the board of directors. The board, in turn, delegates day-to-day business
and operating decisions to corporate officers (managers) and oversees their
actions in the interests of shareholders.28 In line with this model, institutional
investors have adopted a careful hands-off way of dealing with firms where
they invest.29 They do ask questions and collect information on corporate
strategy, financial performance, and the quality of management but do not
directly interfere with managerial decisions because those matters fall
outside the perceived area of expertise of institutional investors and may
27Reinier Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2017) 12.
28Paul Davies, ‘Corporate Boards in the United Kingdom’ in Paul Davies, Klaus J. Hopt, Richard Nowak,
and Gerard van Solinge (eds) Corporate Boards in Law and Practice: A Comparative Analysis in Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 725.
29To be clear, in UK company law, the delegation of the right to manage and operate the company by
the shareholders to the board means that shareholders can qualify the grant of powers to the board in
the company’s constitution by keeping certain powers in their hands; shareholders can also overrule
the board on any matter or give ad hoc instructions to the board on how to exercise the delegated
powers by a 75% majority vote. See Paul Davies, Introduction to Company Law (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2nd edn, 2010) 109; Davies, n 28 above, at 724–25. But instead of active involvement in
managing the business and affairs of the company, as well as setting its business strategy, shareholders
of publicly traded companies in the UK rely more on the trusteeship role of non-executive independent
directors in overseeing executive managers and, to a lesser extent, on reward strategies with perform-
ance-based incentives for executive managers to ensure that the delegated broad powers are not used
for the promotion of the managers’ interests at the expense of the interests of the company and its
shareholders. See Kraakman et al, n 27 above, at 49–50, 62–65, 66–68.
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also undermine the management’s right to manage.30 Institutional investors
reserve their rights to influence business and operating decisions by, for
example, taking control over the appointment and removal of directors, as
a measure of last resort for difficult situations where matters get out of the
board’s control or where there is a conflict with the board.31 In more
regular settings, shareholder efforts aim to improve the decision-making pro-
cesses at the level of the board of directors because effectively functioning
boards monitor corporate executives better and reduce managerial agency
problems.32
The first generation of corporate governance reforms, which focused
almost exceptionally on the improvements of corporate boards of directors,
has further reinforced this practically arranged governance model where
shareholders rely on the board of directors for overseeing executive man-
agers. The central tenet of corporate governance reforms in major jurisdic-
tions was the board of directors as the ‘most prominent actor in corporate
governance’.33 Accordingly, corporate governance reforms, especially in
1990s and early 2000s, targeted predominantly the structure, composition,
and procedures of the board.34 Corporate boards have been reformed to
include independent directors,35 form different committees,36 separate the
positions of the board chairman and the chief executive officer,37 reduce
the duration of office,38 and become more professional.39 The driving force
behind those reforms was the need to improve the board’s role as an inter-
mediary between shareholders and corporate officers. Not only those
reforms strengthened the trusteeship role of the board, but also provided
institutional investors with stronger leverage for direct engagement with
companies on board-related matters based on precise principles.40 By con-
trast, there are no comparable clear-cut reference points for business strategy
and operating matters.
30John Holland, ‘Influence and Intervention by Financial Institutions in Their Investee Companies’ (1998)
6 Corp Gov: Int Rev 249, 251.
31ibid at 255–59.
32Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review’ (1989) 14 Acad Mgmt Rev 57, 65.
33Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation’
(2011) 59 Am J Comp L 1, 19.
34See, for example, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Commit-
tee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) ¶ 1.8, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/
documents/cadbury.pdf (stating that the Report’s corporate governance proposals aim to strengthen
boards and their effectiveness; the main proposals thus focused on the role of non-executive directors
and board committees). The Report is better known by the name of the Committee’s Chairman as the
Cadbury Report.
35Robert Charles Clark, ‘Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Mor-
ality Tale for Policymakers Too’ (2005) 22 Ga St U L Rev 251, 268–69; Hopt, n 33 above, at 25–27.
36Clark, n 35 above, at 270; Hopt, n 33 above, at 31–32.
37Clark, n 35 above, at 271; Hopt, n 33 above, at 32–34.
38Mira Ganor, ‘Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?’ (2008) 33 Del J Corp L 149, 151.
39Clark, n 35 above, at 272–73 (discussing reforms related to the expertise of board members and limits
on serving on different boards).
40Holland, n 30 above, at 251.
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As a result of the division of corporate decision-making powers and the
proliferation of best governance recommendations for effectively functioning
boards, there is a strong embedded view that corporate boards are central in
overseeing business and operating matters. The role of the shareholders of
publicly traded companies, meanwhile, is to improve the functioning of the
board of directors. This arrangement sets certain expectations as to the stew-
ardship role of institutional investors. Although institutional investors can
oversee business and operating matters, overinvolvement in those matters
leads to the duplication of the board’s functions in an area where the
board is perceived to have better expertise. The limited resources of insti-
tutional investors are, instead, better spent on governance aspects that can
improve the performance of the board’s monitoring and oversight functions.
Investors are thus expected to defer to the board of directors on defining
business direction and deciding on business and operating matters. Govern-
ance interventions by institutional investors may sometimes be motivated by
the poor financial performance of target companies, but even then, the sol-
utions proposed or supported aim to improve the functioning of the boards
of directors rather than intervene directly into business and operating
matters. Institutional investors have, based on this arrangement, developed
a vision of stewardship centred on the promotion of good governance stan-
dards. This position is well summarised by George Serafeim who notes that
instead of trying to run the operations of the firm, large investors ‘recognise
that companies through sound management and effective, independent
board oversight are in the best position to determine what will create
long-term value for shareholders’.41
The practice of stewardship arrangements of large investment managers
both reflects the division of powers between shareholders and the board of
directors and reinforces the status quo. Voting and engagement by many
large investment managers takes place through internal stewardship teams
which, as a rule, include experts in corporate governance.42 Portfolio manage-
ment teams of asset managers, on the other hand, have expertise in operating
performance but are not directly involved in stewardship efforts.43 As a result,
41George Serafeim, ‘Investors as Stewards of the Commons?’ (2018) 30 J Applied Corp Fin 8, 13.
42Marco Becht, Julian Franks, and Hannes F. Wagner, ‘Corporate Governance Through Voice and Exit’
(2019) European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance Working Paper No. 633/2019, 8–11,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456626.
43Certainly, not all investment managers draw clear demarcation lines between stewardship teams and
other experts. Marco Becht and his co-authors explain in a recent study of engagement by Aberdeen
Standard Investment, one of the biggest UK asset managers, that different internal groups of specialists
– such as stewardship experts, internal analysts, and fund managers – sit on the same floor and reg-
ularly exchange information, both formally and informally. See Becht et al, n 42 above, at 10. Smaller
investment managers may rely on investment portfolio managers for voting and engagement instead
of creating distinct teams dedicated to stewardship. See James Hamilton and Sheena VanLeuven,
‘Engaging with Neuberger Berman’ Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (10 May
2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/10/engaging-with-neuberger-berman/.
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weak expertise of stewardship teams in business matters and the perception
that the primary focus of stewardship is (and should be) corporate governance
and, more recently, sustainability matters hold back asset managers from
opposing corporate managers on matters beyond this narrow focus. This stew-
ardship specialisationmay also discourage investmentmanagers from support-
ing activist demands that fall outside their perceived stewardship mandate.
Stewardship teams may refuse to support an activist demand and instead
side with corporate managers based on considerations that the demand falls
outside the scope of their typical stewardship efforts and needs to be dealt
with by managers under the oversight of the board of directors.
The second factor explaining why large investment managers prefer a
version of stewardship focusing on select general themes is related to their
incentives for choosing stewardship topics. Large institutional investors diver-
sify firm-specific risks by holding shares in a broad portfolio but are not pro-
tected from market-wide systematic risks. Costs associated with stewardship
efforts lead to a rational decision to be weakly involved in firm-specific stew-
ardship where an investor has a diversified portfolio with reduced firm-
specific risks.44 This apathy extends to many activist demands on business
and operating themes because those demands are, at best, not interesting
for diversified investors from the perspective of reducing the overall portfolio
risks and may even create losses for an entire portfolio if an activist interven-
tion leads to increased risk taking by an important firm with externalities for
others, like systemic banks.45 But diversification, effective though it may be in
dealing with firm-specific risks, cannot protect investors from systematic
market risks.46 For example, climate change poses a risk for a diversified port-
folio by its potential to directly damage assets owned by different firms or to
create indirect transition costs related to social stigma or to stricter regu-
lations implemented in response to climate change.47 Consequently, diver-
sified investors direct stewardship efforts towards matters that can reduce
systematic risks.48 Those matters include global challenges that society is
44Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Systematic Stewardship’ (2021) European Corporate Governance Institute, Law
Working Paper No. 566/2021, 17–18, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782814.
45Gordon, n 44 above, at 3; Luca Enriques and Alessandro Romano, ‘Rewiring Corporate Law for an Inter-
connected World’ (2022 forthcoming) 64 Ariz L Rev 27–31.
46Madison Condon, ‘Externalities and the Common Owner’ (2020) 95 Wash L Rev 1, 17; Gordon, n 44
above, at 2–3.
47Philipp Krueger, Zacharias Sautner, and Laura T. Starks, ‘The Importance of Climate Risks for Insti-
tutional Investors’ (2020) 33 Rev Fin Stud 1067; Condon, n 46 above, at 43–48; José Azar, Miguel
Duro, Igor Kadach, and Gaizka Ormazabal. ‘The Big Three and Corporate Carbon Emissions Around
the World’ (2021) 142 J Fin Econ 674, 677. As an illustration, Mark Carney, the former governor of
the Bank of England, explains that one of the consequences of government actions to comply with
the goals of the 2015 Paris Climate Accord is that substantial parts of proven reserves of oil, gas,
and coal – up to one-third – will become unusable or worthless. This will have negative consequences
not only for resource extracting companies and their suppliers, but also for banks and insurance com-
panies working with those companies, as well as investors involved at every level. See Gillian Tett, ‘Wall
Street’s New Mantra: Green is Good’ Fin Times, Life & Arts (30 January 2021), at 1–2.
48Condon, n 46 above, at 17; Gordon, n 44 above, at 2–3.
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facing, like climate change, sustainability, and inequality, but typically
exclude firm-specific business and operating affairs. This also means that
diversified investors need to assess activist demands based on their impli-
cations for systematic risks.49
Diversified investors acknowledge the importance of systematic risks. Larry
Fink, the CEO of the largest asset manager and leading index investment pro-
vider BlackRock, makes crystal clear that his rhetoric on the materiality of
climate risk for investors is driven by the negative impact of climate
change on assets rather than his personal passion and ethical consider-
ations.50 Many other diversified investors share similar concerns. Indeed, a
survey of institutional investors shows that many believe that governance,
social, and environmental risks are important for their portfolios, although
traditional investment risks (financial and operating risks) remain priority.51
More importantly, consistent with the expectation that diversified insti-
tutional investors are more exposed to wider systematic risks, the biggest
fund groups rank the importance of climate risk higher than other funds.52
Growing evidence shows that the actual behaviour of institutional investors
mirrors their beliefs.53
To be clear, the above does not suggest that activist hedge funds are
indifferent to systematic risks. Systematic risks affect all investors but acti-
vists with highly selective and concentrated portfolios are better posi-
tioned to navigate systematic risks by investing in companies that are
less affected by those risks or by exiting highly exposed investments
before systematic risks reach their peak. As a result, the exposure of acti-
vist hedge funds to systematic risks is weaker. But even where activists
cannot use entry and exit decisions to reduce their exposure to systematic
risks, their business model with a concentrated portfolio discourages
investments in activist demands that promote market-wide risk reduction
without clear and large positive value improvements in targeted firms. As
value investors who carefully select underperforming firms and advocate
49Gordon, n 44 above, at 9.
50Tett, n 47 above, at 1 (quoting Larry Fink: ‘I am 68 years old and have seven grandchildren. I want to
leave the planet better for them, but I am not doing this for environmental reasons – I am a fiduciary
responsible for other people’s money and climate change is affecting their investments.’).
51Krueger et al, n 47 above, at 1079–80.
52ibid at 1081, 1083–84.
53Azar et al, n 47 above, at 681 (collecting global evidence on engagement by the so called ‘Big Three’
asset managers – BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors – and finding that, consistent
with the argument that large investment managers push the most polluting firms to reduce their CO2
emissions, the Big Three are more likely to engage with firms with the highest carbon emissions); Alex-
ander Dyck, Karl V. Lins, Lukas Roth, and Hannes F. Wagner, ‘Do Institutional Investors Drive Corporate
Social Responsibility? International Evidence’ (2019) 131 J Fin Econ 693, 698–700 (offering international
evidence that the rhetoric of diversified institutional investors about the importance of systematic risks
is backed by action: engagement efforts of institutional investors lead to better environmental and
social performance (measured by CO2 emissions, renewable energy use, human rights violations,
and employment quality) in firms where those investors have higher levels of share ownership).
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for changes that help the targeted firms to beat their competitors, acti-
vists cannot rely on demands promoting market-wide changes to earn
returns.54 To the contrary, evidence from a recent study of activist
hedge fund campaigns in the USA shows that sustainability-driven
efforts make firms likely targets of hedge fund activists.55 The authors
explain that hedge fund managers consider corporate investments in
socially responsible activities as ‘wasteful’ with uncertain and very
distant returns.56 Activist demands are thus unlikely to be aligned with
the preferences of highly diversified investors in terms of offering sol-
utions that deal with systematic risks and may, in fact, move in the oppo-
site direction.
In addition to dealing with systematic risks, the integration of popular sus-
tainability topics into investment and stewardship decisions is a marketing
tool that helps fund groups to attract and retain clients.57 Indeed, the
survey of institutional investors on their motivations for considering
climate risk shows that many believe that incorporating climate risk in invest-
ment decisions, along with improving investment returns and reducing port-
folio risks, also protects their reputations and helps attracting fund flows.58
Using popular themes to market funds is especially crucial for actively
managed funds in their fierce competition for clients with passive index
funds. Actively managed funds, unlike passive index trackers, have more
freedom in selecting a portfolio which provides them with broader scope
for integrating social and environmental considerations in their investment
decisions. In this way, actively managed funds can stand out in the
crowded marketplace and compete for the funds of sustainability-focused
asset owners and retail investors. In line with taking more social and environ-
mental approach in investment decisions, managers of these funds also need
to align their stewardship efforts by giving priority to social and environ-
mental themes.
Reputational concerns further undermine the proposed informational role
of activist shareholders, especially hedge funds, which face broad criticism
over their short-term investment targets.59 Hedge funds are believed to be
looking for quick profits because of their high turnover, whereas most
large institutional investors, especially passive index funds, are long-term
54John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘The Coming Shift in Shareholder Activism: From “Firm-Specific” to “Systematic Risk”
Proxy Campaigns (and How to Enable Them)’ (2021) 4, 8–9, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3908163.
55Mark R. DesJardine, Emilio Marti, and Rodolphe Durand, ‘Why Activist Hedge Funds Target Socially
Responsible Firms: The Reaction Costs of Signaling Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2021) 64 Acad
Mgmt J 851, 860–62.
56ibid at 854–55.
57Azar et al, n 47 above, at 675.
58Krueger et al, n 47 above, at 1085–86. Other top motives for considering climate risks are moral/ethical
considerations, legal/fiduciary duties, and the preferences of asset owners. See ibid.
59Hill, n 16 above, at 500–03 (discussing the abundance of negative narratives of shareholder power in
academic literature and media).
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investors.60 In his recent book on responsible businesses, Alex Edmans quotes
BlackRock’s Larry Fink explaining that ‘activists are trying to improve the
company, in most cases, in the short term because they improve the
company and then leave … we are not going to leave’.61 This sentence cap-
tures excellently the general attitude towards activist shareholders and
explains why activist interventions do not receive the overwhelming
support of other investors.
To be fair, evidence on the value effects of activist hedge fund interven-
tions is not one-sided. Influential studies by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang and their
co-authors found that hedge fund interventions increase share prices (with
no reversal during the subsequent year),62 improve profitability,63 and raise
the productivity64 and innovativeness of targeted firms.65 Yet, the concern
is that gains to shareholders from hedge fund activism may come at the
expense of other stakeholders – corporate creditors,66 employees of targeted
firms,67 or buyers (and their shareholders) who ultimately acquire activist-tar-
geted firms68 – rather than from overall value creation. Even when focusing
on the interests of target shareholders alone and accepting the positive
value effects of interventions of activist hedge funds, the widespread percep-
tion (not necessarily consistent with empirical evidence) is that those gains
are short lived. Not surprisingly, activist hedge funds, along with some
other features of capital markets, are often blamed for putting pressure on
publicly traded firms to perform with short-term targets in mind.69 This line
60Alex Edmans, Grow the Pie: How Great Companies Deliver Both Purpose and Profit (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2020) 238.
61ibid.
62Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas, ‘Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Govern-
ance, and Firm Performance’ (2008) 63 J Fin 1729, 1755–56, 1760–63.
63Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Hyunseob Kim, ‘The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset
Allocation, and Labor Outcomes’ (2015) 28 Rev Fin Stud 2723, 2724–25.
64ibid at 2737–38.
65Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Song Ma, and Xuan Tian, ‘How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate
Innovation?’ (2018) 130 J Fin Econ 237, 243–47.
66Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale, and Simone M. Sepe, ‘Activist Hedge Funds and the Corporation’
(2016) 94 Wash U L Rev 261, 298–300 (arguing and offering evidence that hedge fund activism under-
mines company efforts to consider creditor interests and may thus decrease firm valuations over the
long-term period).
67Brav et al, n 63 above, at 2753 (documenting stagnation in productivity-adjusted wages in firms tar-
geted by activist hedge funds).
68Robin Greenwood and Michael Schor, ‘Investor Activism and Takeovers’ (2009) 92 J Fin Econ 362, 368–
70, 371–72 (showing that activist interventions increase the probability of a takeover which, in turn,
explains value creation for target shareholders; returns in targeted firms that do not get acquired
are not statistically different from zero); Nicole M. Boyson, Nickolay Gantchev, and Anil Shivdasani,
‘Activism Mergers’ (2017) 126 J Fin Econ 54, 59–61, 65–67 (the same). This conclusion is echoed by
Professor John Coffee who explains that while the average long-term returns of hedge fund activism
are positive, the returns are skewed and are driven by those activist campaign targets that ultimately
get acquired. See John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Hedge Fund Activism: What Do We Know and Not Know?’ in
William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery (eds) Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds and
Private Equity, Economics and Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 697–98.
69Leo E. Strine, Jr., ‘Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System’ (2017) 126 Yale LJ 1870, 1885, 1938–39.
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of criticism found its way also in the European Union’s recently adopted
Shareholder Rights Directive II where the European rule makers refer to the
short-term pressure of capital markets on companies.70 Thus, by relying on
activists as information agents, investment managers risk drawing on them
fire that currently is directed at activist shareholders.
There are also other reasons why large investment managers may decide
not to support activist shareholders. Possible conflicts of interests and business
ties of fund groups with portfolio firms remain an important concern.71 Firm-
specific information supplied by activists cannot weaken those conflicts. There-
fore, when asset managers face significant stewardship agency costs driven by
conflicts of interests, they may simply ignore activist demands or even
strengthen their support of targeted managers. In fact, the only barrier for
stewardship over a broad range of themes, including on firm-specific business
and operating matters, which activist shareholders can correct is the scarcity of
stewardship resources available to large institutional investors.
Against this background, broad support of activist demands by institutional
investors is not warranted. These investors rely on the boards of directors for
overseeing corporate managers and perceive their role as being limited to
improving the functioning of corporate boards. Additionally, they direct their
attention to general matters that are shared across many companies and
deal with systematics market risks, further limiting stewardship topics. Accord-
ingly, there is small overlap between activist hedge fund demands and the
stewardship preferences of large institutional investors, meaning that activists
can play only limited role in encouraging more informed and active steward-
ship by large institutional investors. These two shareholder groups are more
likely to specialise in different forms of stewardship. Although there is no
clear-cut division between their efforts and occasionally traditional investors
may adopt tactics more often associated with hedge funds,72 hedge funds
are likely to monitor business and performance, whereas diversified investors
tend to focus on governance and sustainability matters.
2.3. Testable hypotheses
The arguments that activists are information intermediaries between firms
and institutional investors and that activists and large institutional investors
70Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 Amending Directive
2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement, 2017 OJ (L 132), at
3 (SRD II).
71Bebchuk et al, n 1 above, at 102 (explaining external conflicts of interest, such as business ties with
portfolio firms, inherent in the business models of large fund groups); John D. Morley, ‘Too Big to
Be Activist’ (2019) 92 S Cal L Rev 1407, 1412 (explaining internal conflicts of interest driven by
differing investment strategies and preferences of various funds within the fund group).
72Consider, for example, the recent attempt by M&G Investments, an asset manager, to change the board
of Methanex, a Canadian chemicals company. See Owen Walker, ‘M&G Takes Activist Stance on Metha-
nex’ Fin Times (19 March 2019), at 14.
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have different visions of stewardship lead to conflicting hypotheses that can
be tested by studying the voting behaviour of large fund groups in firms tar-
geted by activist shareholders. Under the information agent model of activist
shareholders, large investment managers are too big to monitor each
company individually, but access to firm-specific information can be
improved in firms targeted by activists. Even if activist campaigns have a
limited informational role, they may improve stewardship by directing the
attention of institutional investors to specific companies. Therefore, accord-
ing to the first hypothesis, an activist involvement is expected to intensify
stewardship by large asset managers.
Alternatively, large fund groups may be approaching their stewardship
role as corporate governance and sustainability stewards and are expected
to defer to corporate officers and directors on business matters. In this
case, large investment managers are not expected to support activist led
campaigns across the board. Particularly, large investment managers are unli-
kely to support activist campaigns that are perceived to interfere strongly
with the daily management of the business of target firms. But some types
of activist demands, such as governance or environmental activism, align
better with the stewardship topics of large fund groups and may receive
their backing.
Next, the agency cost framework predicts that some fund groups are
expected to be more engaged owners than others and should respond
more positively to activist campaigns. Because stewardship efforts may
have positive impact on a target firm, active asset managers have stronger
incentives to intervene to improve the performance of their portfolio.
Further, active managers obtain firm-specific information in the process of
designing a portfolio which can be used for informed voting. As a result,
according to the second hypothesis, active fund managers are expected to
be better engaged shareholders than passively managed index funds in
the presence of an activist.
In addition to investment style, other characteristics of investors may
influence the intensity of stewardship. Cultural diversity and proximity to
portfolio firms can lead to differences across fund groups based on country
of origin. The size of a controlled shareholding or relative influence (being
a top shareholder) may influence voting too –managers with large exposure
to a firm have stronger incentives to undertake costly informed voting
decisions because those efforts improve their own relative performance
more than the performance of underweighted competitors in the same
firm. Furthermore, large shareholdings in the biggest firms justify informed
stewardship by non-overweighted investors as well because even small
firm value improvements lead to non-trivial increase in the overall portfolio
value which, in turn, leads to higher management fees. Last, investment man-
ager’s freedom to support activist demands may also be constrained by other
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business lines within the group, such as a business division advising compa-
nies against activist campaigns.
3. Methodology and data
3.1. Research design and data sources
To test the predictions set forth above, this article turns to an empirical analy-
sis of the interactions between large investment managers and activist share-
holders by relying on changes in the opposition to management voting
recommendations in activist targeted companies as a measure of voting
stewardship. The underlying assumption is that higher opposition to man-
agement voting recommendations is an indication of stronger stewardship
efforts because engaged shareholders are unlikely to follow management
recommendations on all matters voted on during shareholders’ meetings.
The study uses UK data covering all cases of shareholder activism targeting
the FTSE 350 companies during 2013–2018 and the votes of the largest insti-
tutional investors of those companies.
The first step is the identification of all activist campaigns targeting the
FTSE 350 companies during the years 2013 through 2018. The FTSE 350
index has two subgroups, the FTSE 100 index with the largest 100 companies
by market capitalisation which have their primary listing on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) and the FTSE 250 index comprising the next largest 250 com-
panies. Information on activist campaigns in the FTSE 350 companies was
provided by Activist Insight. The sample period (2013–2018), as explained
below, corresponds to the period for which there are voting records avail-
able for the largest investment managers. The dataset includes all instances
of shareholder activism targeting FTSE 350 companies during 2013–2018
and recorded by Activist Insight. An activist demand can be settled in
private negotiations with corporate managers or, following negative reac-
tion from the target’s managers, be withdrawn by the activist or go to
vote at the shareholders’ meeting. The total number of demands during
this period is 106, but 41 demands were settled or withdrawn before the
first shareholders’ meeting following a demand or were initiated in late
2017 and 2018 with outcomes unknown as of April 2019. As a result, the
final sample includes 65 unique demands outstanding during a share-
holders’ meeting held in 2013–2018.
Next, the study classifies all shareholders’meetings of companies targeted
by activist campaigns into two groups: (1) meetings affected and (2) meetings
not affected by an activist demand. Affected meetings are those where there
is an outstanding demand not settled before the meeting date. All other
meetings are classified as meetings not affected by an activist demand. The
study then compares opposition to management recommendations using
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the voting records of the largest 40 investors (formally voted by asset man-
agers) at activist affected and non-affected meetings. The list of the largest
investors is based on historical annual ownership information of the FTSE
350 companies at the end of a calendar year provided by Bureau van Dijk’s
FAME database. There is no standard way of identifying the largest share-
holders of listed firms.73 This study relies on the average shareholding of
an investor in all activist targeted sample companies over the six-year
study period. The final list includes the largest 40 investors which disclosed
voting records during 2013–2018.
Data on voting records come from Proxy Insight Online. UK institutional
investors, as a rule, did not disclose votes cast at the shareholders’ meetings
of portfolio companies until the introduction of the Stewardship Code, first
published in 2010 and revised in September 2012, which encouraged
voting record disclosure as a best practice recommendation.74 The starting
year of 2013 is the first full year after the introduction of the revised Steward-
ship Code.75 Voting shareholders can cast their votes ‘for’ or ‘against’ man-
agement recommendations or abstain from voting. All votes in line with
management recommendations were coded 0; all other votes (votes
‘against’ or ‘abstain’) were coded 1. An asset manager may also elect not to
cast its vote. These instances, as well as cases where a vote is unknown,
were dropped from the sample. Proxy Insight Online was also the source
for voting recommendations of the leading proxy advisor, Institutional Share-
holder Services (ISS).
Company-level information, such as market capitalisation, return on assets,
leverage, Tobin’s q, and ownership concentration, were collected from
Bureau van Dijk’s FAME database. Information on the inclusion of a target
company in a specific index (FTSE 100 or FTSE 250) comes from the Financial
Times and the LSE.
The dependent variable in all regressions is an asset manager’s vote in
favour or against a management voting recommendation and equals one if
the vote does not follow management recommendation and zero if the
vote is in line with management recommendation. The main explanatory
variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a shareholders’ meeting is
affected by an activist demand and zero otherwise. Given the impact of
73A recent review of existing studies reports that some simply count the number of times an investor
appears among the shareholders of different companies; others use a minimum shareholding
threshold to exclude instances of insignificant share ownership from calculations; the third group of
studies calculates the average shareholding of an investor in two or more companies. See Erik
P. Gilje, Todd A. Gormley, and Doron Levit, ‘Who’s Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership
and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives’ (2020) 137 J Fin Econ 152, 173–74. There are also more soph-
isticated measures. See id. at 155–59.





proxy advisors on voting outcomes,76 one of the variables also captures
differences between ISS, a leading proxy advisory firm, and management
voting recommendations. In addition, on several occasions an activist
demand is initiated by one of the sample asset managers included in the
voting population. Because activists are expected to vote for their own
demands, a dummy variable ‘activist manager’ controls for situations where
an activist making the demand is one of the investment managers whose
voting behaviour this study investigates. All other variables are divided into
four groups. Dummy variables defining an activist are designed to capture
the type of a dissident. Similarly, dummy variables on activist demand identify
the role of different demand topics. Target firm characteristics include several
common firm characteristics and are control variables. Control variables at
the asset manager level capture heterogeneity among asset managers
voting at shareholders’ meetings. Last, the year of an activist demand aims
to account for the increasing incidence of voting against management rec-
ommendations over time.
3.2. Sample overview
The United Kingdom has a lively setting for shareholder activism with the
largest number of annual activist demands in Europe.77 Shareholders made
106 public demands during 2013–2018 targeting the FTSE 350 companies
(Figure 1). Activist demands were rare at the beginning of this period but
intensified during the last three years. In particular, the number of annual
demands starting from 2016 exceeded the combined number of activist
demands made during the preceding three years. Larger companies attracted
disproportionately higher share of activist campaigns. As shown in Figure 1,
two-thirds of activist demands (70 demands) targeted the FTSE 100 compa-
nies; the remaining third (36 demands) involved the FTSE 250 companies.
Figure 2 provides the breakdown of activist demands by the demand topic
and activist characteristics. The toolkit of activists includes a limited number
of typical demands.78 All activist demands, based on Activist Insight’s classifi-
cations, are grouped into six categories. Balance sheet activism includes
demands that call for share buybacks, dividend payments, or sale of assets.
Board related activism, as the name suggests, involves cases where activists
seek to gain board representation or pursue the removal of the target com-
pany’s CEO or other board members. Demands that focus on business, oper-
ational efficiency, and business restructuring are included in the category
business strategy. M&A activism covers demands to spin-off or sell
76Cindy R. Alexander, Mark A. Chen, Duane J. Seppi, and Chester S. Spatt, ‘Interim News and the Role of
Proxy Voting Advice’ (2010) 23 Rev Fin Stud 4419, 4434–37.
77Gomtsian, n 12 above, at 26.
78Cheffins and Armour, n 26 above, at 60–61.
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underperforming or noncore business divisions, push for the sale or merger
of the entire company, or oppose an acquisition of or by the target
company. Remuneration activism is related to the compensation of corporate
officers or directors. All other matters, including proposals to improve corpor-
ate governance standards, amend the company’s articles, or disclose more
information, are combined under the heading other governance activism.
Figure 1. Activist demands in the FTSE 350 companies, 2013–2018.
Figure 2. Activist demands by demand topic and activist type, 2013–2018.
Note: † Includes activist instances initiated by sovereign wealth funds, labour unions, and individual
shareholder associations, such as UK Shareholders’ Association and ShareSoc.
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Figure 2 shows that most activist demands were on M&A, board, and
business strategy related topics. The remaining demands were relatively
evenly distributed among other categories. There are, however, differences
in the demand topic preferences of various types of activist shareholders.
Hedge funds were particularly dominant in M&A activism and, to a lesser
extent, in balance sheet activism. But hedge funds were less likely to
attempt governance or board composition changes. Somewhat surprisingly,
hedge funds were also relatively less active on business strategy. Individual
shareholders initiated most governance demands. Activist campaigns
initiated by investment funds tend to cover broader range of topics and
thus take a middle ground between more specialised campaigns of hedge
funds and individual shareholders. There is thus a certain specialisation
among activist types.
Figure 2 also illustrates that hedge funds initiated the largest number of
activist demands – at more than 41% of the total sample. Almost one-third
of demands came from investment managers, pension funds, and their
associations (32.08%). Individual shareholders made 28 demands (26.42%).
The pool of activist hedge funds targeting the FTSE 350 companies is
small. Seventeen hedge funds, most from the United States, were behind
the 44 activist hedge fund demands. Furthermore, New York-based
Elliott Management Corporation dominated this group with 11 demands
(Figure 3). By contrast, most demands by investment funds were initiated
by UK asset managers.
Figure 3. Most frequent activist hedge funds in the FTSE 350 companies, 2013–2018.
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Table 1 provides information on the size of shareholdings of activist inves-
tors in the FTSE 350 companies over the period 2013–2018. An average acti-
vist shareholder controlled almost 5% of the votes in a target company. The
comparable average shareholding for the subset of activist hedge funds was
slightly lower – at 4.92%. Activist hedge funds rarely started a campaign with
shareholdings below 2% and only exceptionally controlled above 6% of the
target’s votes (Table 1).
Institutional investors have traditionally dominated the ownership land-
scape of publicly traded companies in Britain.79 Table 2 lists the largest share-
holders of the FTSE 350 companies targeted by activist shareholders during
2013–2018.80 All leading shareholders are, without exception, fund groups.
Technically shareholder votes are cast and reported at a fund level. But
most fund families have a leading investment manager which votes shares
on a coordinated basis.81 Two notable exceptions in the sample are
Invesco and Fidelity funds where intra-group fund managers voted differ-
ently on some proposals. To avoid contradictions, the sample includes two
different managers from each of these fund groups. For Invesco funds, the
study uses voting records of Invesco PowerShares, the leading ETF
manager of Invesco funds, which has the largest record of the FTSE 350
shares voted by Invesco funds, and Invesco Advisers, the main manager of
active funds. Similarly, for funds affiliated with Fidelity Investments, the
study uses votes cast by FMR which votes all shares held by Fidelity funds
except for passive funds; Geode Capital Management, a relatively smaller
asset manager, is responsible for the management of Fidelity’s passive funds.
The origin of an investor is based on the location of its main asset
manager.82 For example, The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. is an American










Activist Hedge Fund 0.21 4.92 5.00 15.00
Investment or Pension Fund 0.11 4.53 1.25 19.66
Individual Shareholder† 0.00 5.53 0.00 33.73
Total 0.00 4.98 3.40 33.73
Note: † Includes activist instances initiated by sovereign wealth funds, labour unions, and individual
shareholder associations, such as UK Shareholders’ Association and ShareSoc.
79Gomtsian, n 12 above, at 7–14.
80Large fund groups that did not disclose their voting records during 2013–2018, including Affiliated
Managers Group, Inc., Silchester Partners Limited, Lindsell Train Limited, Lloyds Banking Group PLC,
Rathbone Brothers PLC, Credit Suisse Group AG, and Hargreaves Lansdown PLC, are excluded from
the list.
81Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk, and Javier Garcia-Bernardo, ‘Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive
Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk’ (2017) 19 Bus & Pol
298, 316.
82The division of fund groups based on nationality and management style sometimes requires simplifi-
cation of the reality. Some foreign fund families manage their UK investments through locally formed
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banking holding company, but its most UK shareholdings are managed by
London-based Newton Investment Management. The largest shareholders
are almost equally divided between UK (18) and US-based (17) fund
groups. This reflects the boarder ownership structure of publicly traded
Table 2. Top shareholders of activist targeted FTSE 350 companies, 2013–2018.





BlackRock, Inc. (BlackRock) 5.10 USA Passive
Legal & General Group PLC (Legal & General Inv. Mgmt.) 2.29 GBR Passive
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) 2.26 NOR Passive
Invesco Ltd. (Invesco PowerShares) 2.25 USA Passive
--- (Invesco Advisers, Inc.) – – Active
Capital Group Companies (Capital Research Global Investors) 2.22 USA Active
Schroders PLC (Schroder Inv. Mgmt.) 2.04 GBR Active
The Vanguard Group, Inc. (Vanguard Group) 1.85 USA Passive
State Street Corp. (SSgA Funds Management, Inc.) 1.74 USA Passive
Aberdeen Asset Management PLC (Aberdeen Asset Mgmt.)† 1.62 GBR Active
Standard Life Aberdeen PLC (Aberdeen Standard Inv.)† 1.60 GBR Active
M&G Group PLC (M&G Investments) 1.40 GBR Passive
Ameriprise Financial, Inc. (Columbia Threadneedle Inv. (UK)) 1.36 GBR Active
FMR LLC (Fidelity Management & Research Company) 1.32 USA Active
UBS AG (UBS Global Asset Mgmt.) 1.16 CHE Active
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan Inv. Mgmt.) 0.84 USA Active
The Royal London Group (Royal London Asset Mgmt.) 0.84 GBR Active
Sun Life Financial, Inc. (MFS Inv. Mgmt.) 0.74 USA Active
Franklin Resources, Inc. (Franklin Templeton Inv.) 0.67 USA Active
Majedie Asset Management Limited (Majedie) 0.64 GBR Active
AXA SA (AXA Inv. Managers) 0.63 FRA Active
T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. (T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.) 0.61 USA Active
Northern Trust Corporation (Northern Trust Investments) 0.60 USA Active
Investec PLC (Ninety One UK Limited) 0.58 GBR Active
Aviva PLC (Aviva Investors) 0.57 GBR Active
Fidelity International Limited (Fidelity International) 0.56 GBR Active
The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (Newton Inv. Mgmt.) 0.56 GBR Active
OM Residual UK Limited (Old Mutual Global Investors) 0.56 GBR Active
HSBC Holdings PLC (HSBC Global Asset Mgmt.) 0.51 GBR Active
Deutsche Bank AG (DWS Investments GmbH) 0.50 GER Active
BPCE SA (Harris Associates) 0.47 USA Active
Dimensional Fund Advisors LP (Dimensional Fund Advisors) 0.46 USA Active
Morgan Stanley (Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt., Inc.) 0.46 USA Active
Baillie Gifford & Co. Limited (Baillie Gifford & Co.) 0.39 GBR Active
Toronto Dominion Bank (TD Asset Mgmt.) 0.36 CAN Active
Janus Henderson Group PLC (Henderson Global Investors Ltd.) 0.35 GBR Active
Jupiter Fund Management PLC (Jupiter Asset Mgmt.) 0.34 GBR Active
Wellington Management Group LLP (Wellington Mgmt. Co.) 0.33 USA Active
Brewin Dolphin Holdings PLC (Brewin Dolphin Limited) 0.17 GBR Active
Geode Capital Holdings LLC (Geode Capital Mgmt.) 0.10 USA Passive
Note: † Aberdeen Asset Mgmt. and Standard Life Inv. merged in 2017 to form Standard Life Aberdeen
PLC.
investment advisors, which can also participate in local trade groups and have substantial presence in
the City of London. This means that some formally foreign fund families, due to strong local presence,
may act more like other UK-based asset managers than their foreign peers. See Andrew F. Tuch, ‘Proxy
Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light’ (2019) 99 BU L Rev 1459, 1502–03. This explains the study’s
approach to classify some fund families by the origin of the main asset manager where voting and
engagement decisions are taken rather than by the location of the parent company’s headquarters.
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companies in Britain.83 The sample also includes investors from five other
countries: Norway, Switzerland, France, Germany, and Canada.
The big fund groups differed in their dominant investment styles
(Table 2).84 The largest index managers, which also appear to be the
largest managers by total assets under management, are the US big three
– BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors. Passive investing
is less common outside the United States. The largest UK-based asset man-
agers follow active investment styles more often with only a few managing
large passive index tracker funds. Legal & General Investment Management
and M&G Investments are the largest among the few British managers with
substantial passively managed funds.
Figure 4 compares disapproval rates at activist effected and non-affected
shareholders’ meetings over time. The average six-year voting disapproval
rate of all asset managers was marginal and stood at 0.03. In other words,
in a shareholders’ meeting including 25 agenda items, an average asset
manager was expected to vote against management voting recommen-
dations on less than one item. Given the routine nature of many proposals,
like dividend approvals, auditor appointments, or political donation authoriz-
ations, the low disapproval rate does not come as a surprise. But the disap-
proval rate at shareholders’ meetings with an outstanding activist demand
Figure 4. Disapproval rate at activist affected and non-affected meetings.
83Gomtsian, n 12 above, at 7.
84Large fund families combine many investment funds with various investment strategies under one
roof. See Morley, n 71 above, at 1416. These funds are, as a rule, managed by a single asset
manager which must consider the interests of both active and passive funds in deciding how to
vote the shares of portfolio companies owned by those funds. The classification in this study
follows a basic approach of grouping fund groups based on their dominant investment style.
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was 12.4% higher compared to other meetings. Moreover, although the
values of the disapproval rate increased over time, the growth rate was
higher for the meetings affected by an activist demand. This offers tentative
support for the growing influence of activist campaigns, a trend that may
continue in the future.
4. Empirical results
This section presents the findings in two parts. First, results are presented for
investment managers in general. Next, the presentation focuses on different
groups of investment managers based on their characteristics: the dominant
investment style and the country of origin. Modelling concerns are addressed
at the end.
4.1. Voting by investment managers in general
Panel A in Table 3 reports regression results using votes of asset managers
along with or against management voting recommendations as a dependent
variable. Column (1) shows the results for votes cast by all 40 asset managers
included in the sample. Consistent with prior studies,85 the strongest corre-
lation of the votes is with proxy advisor recommendations: an ISS recommen-
dation to vote against management is associated with more than 11% higher
opposition to management. Asset managers are also more likely to vote
against management recommendations in the FTSE 250 firms, but they
align stronger with managers in companies comprising the FTSE 100 index.86
In addition, the analysis reveals associations between voting patterns and
activist campaigns. Although the involvement of an activist does not have a
significant association with the voting behaviour of asset managers, the type
of an activist and demand topics are clearly linked with changes in their votes.
More specifically, column (3) in Panel A shows that large investment man-
agers are more likely to vote against management recommendations in com-
panies dealing with an unsettled activist demand made by other investment
fundmanagers. Demands by hedge funds and individual shareholders, mean-
while, have a negative relationship with the voting opposition to manage-
ment recommendations. This finding suggests that large asset managers
do not change their voting behaviour in the presence of an activist in
general, but the type of an activist does matter. Investment (pension) fund
85Alexander et al, n 76 above, at 4434–37.
86The estimated effects of statistically significant variables are relatively low economically because all
regression models measure the association between activist campaigns and all items voted during
shareholders’ meetings, including routine matters like an approval of financial accounts and state-
ments or an authorization of political donations. In unreported tests, the direction and significance
of coefficients remain unchanged when routine matters are dropped from the analysis, but their
values increase.
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Table 3. Multivariate regression analysis of voting in activist-targeted companies.
Panel A. The reaction of large investment managers to activist demands
Dependent variable =

































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Asset manager fixed
effects
No Yes Yes Yes No
Log likelihood −12,869.57 −12,202.40 −12,162.53 −12,180.60 −9,690,09
Pseudo R2 0.1955 0.2363 0.2388 0.2376 0.1817
Observations 119,494 118,833 118,833 118,833 86,378
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Panel B. Reaction to activist demands by asset managers with different investment styles
Dependent var.
=











































































































Target controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Asset manager
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood −2,965.40 −2,949.69 −2,954.44 −9,191.09 −9,165.28 −9,176.12
Pseudo R2 0.2369 0.2409 0.2397 0.2397 0.2418 0.2409
Observations 30,408 30,408 30,408 88,425 88,425 88,425
Panel C. Reaction to activist demands by investment managers from different countries
Dependent var.
=
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Table 3. Continued.
Panel C. Reaction to activist demands by investment managers from different countries
Dependent var.
=




















































Target controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Asset manager
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood −6,419.82 −6,394.79 −6,410.29 −4,403.22 −4,388.17 −4,384.58
Pseudo R2 0.1973 0.2004 0.1985 0.2638 0.2663 0.2669
Observations 51,621 51,621 51,621 50,016 50,016 50,016
Note: The dependent variable is an asset manager’s vote in favour or against a management voting rec-
ommendation and equals 1 if the vote does not follow management recommendation and 0 if the vote
is in line with management recommendation. Panel A reports results for votes by all 40 asset managers,
but in column (5) the sample includes only activist demands classified as unsuccessful or ongoing by
their outcome; columns (1) and (2) report results for all activist demands without distinguishing activist
types and demand topics, but column (2) adds industry fixed effects; explanatory variables in columns
(3) and (4) are activist types and demand topics, respectively. Panel B reports regression results by grouping
asset managers with different investment style into passive (index) asset managers (columns (1)-(3)) and
active fundmanagers (columns (4)-(6)). Panel C uses the country of origin for the classification of asset man-
agers into UK-based asset managers (columns (1)-(3)) and US-based investment managers (columns (4)-(6)).
In Panels B and C, columns (1) and (4) report results for all activist demands without distinguishing activist
types and demand topics; explanatory variables in columns (2) and (5) are activist types; columns (3) and (6)
use explanatory variables based on demand topics. The classification of asset managers by investment style
or by the country of origin is based on information from Table 2. The probit regression models report mar-
ginal effects and standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level; two
asterisks denote significance at the 5% level; and three asterisks at the 1% level. The main explanatory vari-
able is a dummy variable taking values 1 if a shareholders’ meeting (and all decisions included in the
meeting agenda) is affected by an activist demand and 0 otherwise. ISS recommendation is a dummy vari-
able based on the comparison of the recommendations by ISS and the company management. FTSE 250 is
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a company is a member of the FTSE 250 index. Activist manager is
a dummy variable capturing situations where one of the sample investment managers is the activist
making a demand. All independent variables in categories ‘Activist Type’ and ‘Demand Type’ are
dummy variables with values 1 or 0 indicating to the activist type and demand topic. Most independent
variables in the category ‘Asset Manager Characteristics’ are dummy variables denoting the origin, invest-
ment strategy, and voting power of a given asset manager; shareholding size is a continuous number
showing the asset manager’s shareholding in a company. The size of the shareholding is defined based
on information at the end of the year. Target company controls include financial indicators (market capi-
talisation, return on assets, Tobin’s q, dividend yield, and leverage) based on the latest annual results dis-
closed before a shareholders’meeting. Market capitalisation is taken at the date of the latest annual results
and is transformed into log. Additionally, target company controls account for ownership concentration
based on the combined ownership of the largest 10 shareholders in the company. For brevity, target
company controls are not reported. Because the values of the overall voting disapproval rate increased
during 2016–2018 compared to earlier years (Figure 4), all probit regression models include year fixed
effects. Some regression models use industry fixed effects to control for differences among sample invest-
ment managers.
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demands receive stronger backing, whereas activist demands made by hedge
funds and individuals are unlikely to be supported by the largest investment
managers. This is not surprising given shared visions and preferences of the
largest investment managers.
Similarly, the results reported in column (4) of Panel A show that activist
campaign topics make a difference in receiving the support of large asset
managers. Balance sheet and M&A demands, which are often linked to acti-
vist hedge funds, demonstrate significant negative associations with the
opposition to management from large asset managers. In other words,
large asset managers tend to perceive demands on selling parts of or all
business, pulling out of a merger, or increasing payouts as falling outside
the scope of their stewardship. As a result, some activist campaigns
align large investment managers stronger with the managers of targeted
firms by increasing the likelihood of following management voting rec-
ommendations. Large investment managers are more open to remuneration
and governance activism, which are both positively associated with stronger
opposition to management (the effect of governance activism is less robust
and falls short of statistical significance (p-value is 0.107)). Board related
and business strategy activism do not demonstrate any significant relation-
ship with the voting outcomes of large investment managers. Institutional
investors are thus refraining from intervening in the board’s internal affairs
or in business matters but are willing to engage on pay and governance
matters.
When it comes to the characteristics of large asset managers, one of the
important findings is that fund groups with a larger proportion of passive
funds are more likely to support management during voting at a share-
holders’ meeting. Although the probability of stronger management
support by passive investors is economically marginal (0.18%), the result is
close to being statistically significant (p-value of 0.114). This evidence is con-
sistent with the findings of a study by Alon Brav and his co-authors who
report that passive funds are less likely to vote for dissidents during contested
board elections in US corporations.87 Another important finding is that UK-
based asset managers have much higher opposition rates than their
foreign, including American, peers.88 As a result, an asset manager’s origin
may define the likelihood of supporting (opposing) activist demands (man-
agement voting recommendations). But the size of the shareholding
87Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li, and James Pinnington, ‘Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How
Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests’ (2019) European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance
Working Paper No. 601/2019, 25, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3101473.
88Column (1) in Table 6 shows that regression results are significant for both US and UK asset managers,
but the probability of the association between the country of origin and opposition to management is
economically much higher for UK-based asset managers.
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 29
controlled by an asset manager and its leading position among the target
company’s shareholders do not matter.
Considering that there may be other individual effects unique to each
asset manager, column (2) in Panel A reports regression results using asset
manager fixed effects. All significant results and the direction of association
(signs) remain unchanged. Also, this regression model does not lead to a
major increase in the value of R2, suggesting that the reported independent
variables account for most major asset manager characteristics.
To sum up, activist demands in general are not associated with significant
changes in the voting behaviour of large investment managers. But the
responses of investment managers vary based on the activist types and
demand topics. Activism campaigns initiated by investment funds are associ-
ated with higher votes against management. By contrast, demands targeting
balance sheet, board composition, business strategy, and M&A strengthen
the support of management voting recommendations during shareholders’
meetings. Importantly, as predicted by the second hypothesis, early evidence
shows that investment style and geographic origin may influence this finding.
Thus, the analysis turns next to the question whether the voting patterns of
asset managers in activist targeted companies differ based on the manager’s
dominant investment style or the country of origin.
4.2. Voting by investment managers with different investment styles
and from different countries
Panel B in Table 3 reports the results of regressions using the votes of asset
managers with predominantly passive (index investing) or active investment
styles, respectively. The results offer mixed evidence in support for the
hypothesis that passive fund managers are the ones who are silencing the
voice of activist shareholders by voting along with management recommen-
dations. There are, indeed, differences in the voting practices of passive and
active asset managers. Column (1) in Panel B shows that passive fund man-
agers are significantly less likely to support activist demands generally. The
corresponding results for active fund managers reported in column (4) of
Panel B show that active fund managers, by contrast, are significantly more
likely to vote against corporate managers in the presence of an activist.
However, a closer look shows that both passive and active fund managers
are not receptive to hedge fund demands but are likelier to support activism
initiated by other investment managers (columns (2) and (5) in Panel B).
Passive and active fund managers also differ in their preferences of the
topics of activist demands, but, clearly, business and operating matters are
not associated with higher voting opposition to corporate managers. Both
strongly side with corporate managers in companies targeted by balance
sheet demands; passive fund managers also oppose M&A activism. If
30 S. GOMTSIAN
anything, passive fund managers are more open to some business matters
like demands over business strategy (columns (3) and (6) in Panel B). This
means that the managers of active funds are ready to support activists
only over a limited range of governance and remuneration related topics
which do not involve business matters. Last, active fund managers align
stronger with the recommendations of ISS than passive fund managers.
The support for activist demands differs also based on the origin of invest-
ment managers. Panel C reports regression results for votes by UK or US-
based asset managers. The results show that UK asset managers are the
main backers of governance activism. According to the results reported in
columns (3) and (6) in Panel C, UK-based asset managers are more likely to
support activists on governance demands, whereas the voting outcomes of
US asset managers on governance activism demonstrate negative relation-
ship. Both findings are statistically robust. There are also significant differ-
ences between UK and US managers on business related demand topics
that they are unlikely to support. Particularly, UK asset managers tend to
oppose clearly only balance sheet activism, whereas US managers, in addition
to balance sheet activism, turn down M&A and board related demands as
well. When it comes to the activist type, investors from both countries
support demands by investment funds and their associations, but the prob-
ability of support is less pronounced in the case of American asset managers
(columns (2) and (5) in Panel C).
To illustrate these findings further, Figure 5 ranks top-12 asset managers
that increased opposition to management in the presence of an activist
Figure 5. Top pro-activist and pro-management asset managers, 2013–2018.
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demand the most and 12 asset managers that, conversely, followed manage-
ment voting recommendations more often in companies targeted by acti-
vists. The ranking is based on the percentage change of the disapproval
rate at activist-affected and non-affected shareholders’ meeting. The
number in brackets next to the percentage change indicates to the actual
change of the disapproval rate. On average, the disapproval rate is 12.4%
higher at shareholders’ meetings where the company faces an outstanding
activist demand than at non-affected meetings.
In line with the regression results reported in Panel B, Figure 5 illustrates
that the association between different investment styles and the likelihood
of supporting activist shareholders is not clear cut. The list of pro-activist
asset managers includes only active fund managers, but the list of pro-man-
agement asset managers combines both active and passive fund managers.89
Moreover, the two large British fund groups with substantial passive funds,
Legal & General Group and M&G Group, tend to oppose management
more often in companies targeted by activists.90 Remarkably, the voting
behaviour of the passive and active asset management divisions of Invesco
differs little. To complicate matters further, the active manager of Fidelity
funds is voting more pro-management than the passive manager. Particu-
larly, FMR is the most pro-management asset manager, but Geode Capital
Management, which is responsible for the management of Fidelity’s
passive funds, although still ranked among pro-management peers (not
included in the figure), increases the support of management recommen-
dations at activist affected meetings at a much lower rate (6.9% versus
67.8%). That said, there are several passive fund groups that, indeed, are
less likely to support activists and their large shareholdings in target compa-
nies magnify their influence. For example, US passive giants BlackRock, Van-
guard Group, and State Street Corp., which are also among the largest
shareholders of target companies, are in a group of the top pro-management
asset managers.
Overall, individual asset managers differ in the ways they respond to acti-
vist campaigns. These differences are only weakly associated with different
89Notably, JPMorgan Investment Management is among the asset managers that are likely to vote in line
with management recommendations more often in the presence of an activist than otherwise. JPMor-
gan Chase & Co., the asset manager’s parent, has a leading division advising corporate clients on how
to engage with shareholders to defend the company from an activist campaign. See Ortenca Aliaj,
‘JPMorgan Reshuffles Staff to Manage Activist Campaigns’ Fin Times FTfm (10 August 2020), at
3. The bank is also actively promoting among corporate clients its new data analytics tool modelling
shareholder behaviour which helps corporate clients to predict how different institutional investors
typically respond to different activists. See Laura Noonan, ‘JPMorgan Launches Shareholder Activism
Tool’ Fin Times (22 July 2019), at 10. The role of a leading defence advisor in activist campaigns
may create tensions for the bank’s asset management arm when voting in activist targeted companies.
90Legal & General Group and M&G Group are just below the top-12 pro-activist asset managers with the
relative change of the disapproval rate at regular and activist affected meetings of 24.5% and 22.8%,
respectively.
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investment styles. Although the top pro-activist asset managers tend to be
affiliated with mostly active funds, both passive and active investment
styles are common at the bottom of the list of the least pro-activist fund
groups. As a result, broad claims about the ‘silencing’ effect of passive
funds on shareholder activism in general may be overstated. This finding is
consistent with evidence on the interactions between institutional investors
and activists in US target companies. Simi Kedia and her co-authors show that
the propensity of passive and active investors to support activist campaigns
in the USA is mixed.91 In addition to different investment styles, the location
of a fund group’s strategic engagement decision-making team offers some
clues about its likely response to an activist campaign too.
4.3. Modelling concerns
The design of the study addresses concerns about a potential selection bias in
the sample, namely that voting behaviour of investment managers during
activist affected and non-affected shareholders’ meetings may not differ
because activist demands are already reflected in management-sponsored
proposals and voting recommendations. Corporate managers work hard to
make shareholders’ meetings as boring as possible, as evidenced by the
common practice of achieving approval rates for many proposals above
90%. They are expected to work even harder to secure necessary shareholder
votes when an activist shareholder knocks at the door. Hence, two potential
concerns arise. First, corporate managers could, in theory, manipulate voting
agenda items by omitting controversial matters to gather shareholder
support without caving to the pressure of activists; managers could also
make careful voting recommendations aligned with the expected share-
holder votes. But this is not a major concern for this study because managers
have limited scope to fine-tune voting agendas in UK corporate practice.92
Shareholders of British firms vote annually on a standard set of matters
and, as a result, the topics of voting agendas are highly similar both across
firms and within firms over years.93 Furthermore, almost all voting agenda
91Simi Kedia, Laura Starks, and Xianjue Wang, ‘Institutional Investors and Hedge Fund Activism’ (2021) 10
Rev Corp Fin Stud 1, 31–33.
92Even if managers can manipulate the voting agenda to a certain extent, this still leaves shareholders
with the option of casting protest votes on other items, such as voting against director reelection or
management remuneration. See Katelouzou, n 25 above, at 824. The finding that activist campaigns
are not generally associated with such protest votes is a suggestion that large investment managers
and activist shareholders have different stewardship preferences. It is still possible that target man-
agers make unobserved private promises prior to voting to gather shareholder support; this
concern is addressed separately below.
93Common voting agenda items are described in Gomtsian, n 2 above, at 685. Notably, many items are
included in voting agendas under prescriptive company law requirements. For example, managers
cannot exclude the voting on the company’s remuneration report and remuneration policy, the two
most controversial items, from the voting agenda. See Companies Act 2006, ss 439(1), (5), 439A(1).
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items are management sponsored with a universal management recommen-
dation to support those items.94 Finally, by populating the sample with con-
tested demands only, i.e. demands that were not settled before the meeting
date, the study reduces the likelihood of the demand being reflected in man-
agement voting recommendations.
The second concern is that corporate managers may attempt to influence
shareholder votes via private negotiations with key shareholders. It may well
be possible for managers to communicate their intention to comply with the
demand fully or partially in future during private meetings or calls with the
largest institutional investors that typically take place ahead of shareholders’
meetings. This information, although not observable, can certainly influence
voting decisions of informed shareholders. By focusing only on contested
demands, the study’s research design deals with concerns that private unob-
servable information may influence voting outcomes. As a further robustness
check, tests were run on a subsample excluding all activist demands that
were withdrawn or became successful after the date of the shareholders’
meeting. This subsample includes only unsuccessful demands that were pub-
licly opposed by target company managers and makes it unlikely that target
managers made private promises to institutional investors to comply with
those demands in exchange for their voting support. The findings, as reported
in column (5) of Panel A in Table 3, are not sensitive to using the alternative
sample. The results for the main explanatory and control variables remain
largely unchanged and are similar to regressions in column (1) of Panel
A. This means that unobserved private negotiations between large investment
managers and target company managers are unlikely to drive the findings.
Another potential concern is that activist shareholders may pick target com-
panies based on the ownership structure and the perceived friendliness of the
company’s existing shareholders. Recent studies show that activists pick targets
strategically by incorporating ownership composition, i.e. how activist friendly
shareholders are, in their decisions to select targets and activist campaigns
topics.95 The sample of this study includes only companies targeted by activists
and may thus amplify the effects of pro-activist voting. But as shown above, the
study does not find overwhelming pro-activist voting by the largest investment
managers. Moreover, the top shareholders of the sample companies are largely
94Gomtsian, n 2 above, at 685 (showing that over 99% of proposals voted by the shareholders of the FTSE
100 companies are management sponsored with positive management recommendations).
95Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley, and Donald B. Keim, ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of
Passive Investors on Activism’ (2019) 32 Rev Fin Stud 2720, 2740–41; Kedia et al, n 91 above, at 14–17;
Brav et al, n 87 above, at 26. Two of those studies offer contradictory findings but both identify target
company shareholder composition as an important factor in activists’ targeting considerations. Particu-
larly, Alon Brav and his co-authors find that activists are less likely to target a firm that has higher
passive fund ownership. See Brav et al, n 87 above, at 26. By contrast, Ian Appel and his co-authors
do not find statistically significant association between passive ownership and the likelihood of acti-
vism but show that ownership influences the types of activist campaigns. See Appel et al, n 95
above, at 2738–39.
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the same investors that dominate the ownership structures of the FTSE 350
companies in general. The sample companies also do not differ from the
entire population of the FTSE 350 companies in terms of the average ownership
concentration levels. Accordingly, the findings are not likely to be driven by the
unique ownership structures of the target companies.
5. Discussion and implications for corporate law reform
5.1. Discussion of the findings
The findings reported above offer mixed support for the hypotheses that
information supplied by activist involvement amplifies the stewardship
efforts of large institutional investors. Activist demands in general are not
associated with significant changes in the voting behaviour of large invest-
ment managers. This is consistent with the argument that large investment
managers and activist shareholder have different visions of stewardship. Fur-
thermore, the responses of investment managers vary based on the activist
and demand types. Again, in line with the vision of stewardship focusing
on the promotion of governance and sustainability standards, activist
demands on business and operating matters are the least likely to receive
the support of large investment managers. Only specific types of activism –
remuneration and governance activism – attract their support. Large asset
managers consider other demands, especially those popular among hedge
fund activists, to fall beyond their stewardship expertise. Overall, these
findings point to a limited role of activist shareholders in informing and
encouraging firm-specific stewardship by institutional investors.
It is tempting to explain the reluctance of institutional investors to vote
against management in activist targeted companies by their preference to
maintain a private communication channel with corporate officers which,
arguably, can be more effective for influencing corporate decisions.96 This
is an unlikely explanation of the findings for several reasons. First, if fund
managers seek not to anger corporate officers and leave a door open for
private engagement, then we would expect them to vote in line with man-
agement voting recommendations regardless of an activist type. But, as
reported in Panel B, Table 3, investment managers are likely to vote against
management where activist campaigns are initiated by other investment
funds. Second, variation in the voting practices of different asset managers
casts further doubts on the soundness of the explanation that they support
management during voting to maintain channels for private engagement.
Furthermore, the preference for private engagement must be the strongest
96For example, Matthew J. Mallow and Jasmin Sethi, ‘Engagement: The Missing Middle Approach in the
Bebchuk-Strine Debate’ (2016) 12 NYU J L & Bus 385, 392 (arguing that engagement with boards and
corporate officers can lead to changes through incremental, non-confrontational means).
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for active managers with larger shareholdings in target companies, but
neither the size of the shareholding, nor being among the top 10 share-
holders of activist targeted firms has a significant association with the
voting behaviour of active fund managers.
Apart from differences based on an investment style, the findings also
demonstrate differences in the voting patterns of investment managers
based in and outside the UK. These differences may be driven by the close-
knit ties and shared preferences of asset managers located in the City of
London.97 Most investment fund activist demands come from UK-based man-
agers or their associations and, not surprisingly, find support among other UK
peers, which are often members in the same local trade associations. But
some US asset managers, like BlackRock, have strong presence in the City
of London as well, suggesting that there may also be differences in the stew-
ardship preferences of investors from different regions.
The interest of UK investors in governance best standards may be associ-
ated with the country’s lead in corporate governance reforms and the central
role of institutional investors in promoting compliance with governance rec-
ommendations. Fund groups are situated within a given society and political
tradition, which influence their internal decision-making.98 Good corporate
governance rose to prominence in Britain later than in the United States,
but it is currently an integral element of the governance landscape of publicly
traded companies.99 Compared to the US, the UK has a more technical to cor-
porate governance guidelines with specific recommendations for companies
and the investors in many different situations.100 Highly detailed provisions of
corporate governance codes make it easier for institutional investors to apply
them to portfolio companies or issue governance guidelines. Importantly,
corporate governance reforms in Britain have strongly emphasised the
responsibility of institutional investors in encouraging compliance by compa-
nies. Since the Cadbury Committee report in 1992, but especially since late
1990s and early 2000s, UK institutional investors have been encouraged to
be more active in the governance of investee companies.101 Various
support frameworks assist institutional investors in this regard. Many of the
97Kerry Shannon Burke, ‘Regulating Corporate Governance Through the Market: Comparing the
Approaches of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom’ (2002) 27 J Corp L 341, 374;
Tuch, n 82 above, at 1488–89.
98Ruth V. Aguilera, Cynthia A. Williams, John M. Conley, and Deborah E. Rupp, ‘Corporate Governance
and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and the US’ (2006) 14 Corp Gov: Int Rev
147, 148.
99Brian R. Cheffins, ‘The Rise of Corporate Governance in the UK: When and Why’ (2015) 68 Current Legal
Problems 387, 404–05.
100Burke, n 97 above, at 373–74.
101Karel Lannoo, ‘A European Perspective on Corporate Governance’ (1999) 37 J Common Market Stud
269, 283; Aguilera et al, n 98 above, at 151; Christine A. Mallin, ‘Corporate Governance Developments
in the UK’ in Christine A. Mallin (ed) Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2nd edn, 2015) 10–12.
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largest institutional investors are part of industry representative bodies, such
as The Investment Association or the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Associ-
ation, which monitor the governance activities of companies and advise
their members accordingly.102 Also, social and environmental matters
receive greater attention from both companies and investors in the United
Kingdom, partially due to extensive media coverage, than in the United
States.103 As a result, an average UK institutional investor is more attentive
to governance and sustainability matters.
Furthermore, the US regulatory landscape discourages active stewardship
by institutional investors.104 Home-country regulatory constraints may have
effects beyond national borders and influence the stewardship perceptions
of institutional investors even where they invest abroad. John Morley explains
that strict disclosure rules in the US discourage institutional investors from
intervening in corporate matters extensively, and although these rules do
not apply outside the country, US asset managers are likely to adopt a con-
sistent approach towards stewardship across different markets informed by
policies from headquarters.105
5.2. Implications of the findings for corporate law reform
The finding that large investment managers and many activist shareholders
perform largely separate roles in corporate governance has an important
policy implication. It begs the question of whether stewardship by invest-
ment managers may become all-inclusive and replace many forms of activism
in the future. Large investment managers view their stewardship role as the
monitors and promoters of good governance and sustainability standards in
portfolio firms. Although some of these investors are ready to support acti-
vists in their efforts, there is little expertise overlap between the two
groups of stewards. This means that large investment managers and activist
shareholders do not replace each other. Accordingly, policy efforts to
strengthen shareholder stewardship should not dismiss any of the two
groups and should not focus on one only, as this is likely to result in partial
monitoring of corporate activities by shareholders. Both institutional inves-
tors and activist shareholders need stronger encouragement to perform
their respective stewardship roles if policymakers aim to build balanced
and comprehensive stewardship frameworks.
Without such encouragement, shareholder stewardship is likely to become
less pluralistic and converge towards a narrow range of topics that are priority
for the most influential investors. In search for the support of large
102Christine A. Mallin, Corporate Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th edn, 2013) 109.
103Aguilera et al, n 98 above, at 151–52.
104Black, n 21 above, at 530–32.
105Morley, n 71 above, at 1423–30.
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investment managers, activist shareholders come under pressure to revise
their strategies and integrate the preferences of large asset managers on
the broader impact (footprint) of businesses on society and environment
into their demands. As such, activist demands are very likely to evolve over
time and become more focused on topics aligned with the preferences of
large investment managers. These changes will drive out some activist share-
holders from the market and bring the surviving activists closer to large
investment managers, thereby leading to the convergence of their steward-
ship visions. Activist shareholders can then facilitate and augment the sus-
tainability-oriented stewardship efforts of large investment managers, as
envisioned by Anna Christie.106 But these changes will also have a negative
impact on the breadth (the range of topics addressed by interventions)
and the depth (the extent to which tailored interventions address
company-specific needs rather than general best practice standards) of share-
holder stewardship by dramatically reducing the supply of monitoring and
engagement over business and operating matters.
There is thus a need for regulatory efforts that can protect and encourage
various forms of shareholder stewardship, including stewardship over
business and operating matters as originally targeted by activist hedge
funds. Stewardship preferences of different groups of shareholders add
value by putting the emphasis on diverse topics that matter for financial or
non-financial corporate performance. By recognising the important roles of
different shareholder groups, corporate law can reduce the likelihood of
moving towards more homogenous basis of shareholder stewardship and
losing diversity in stewardship topics. The remainder of this article discusses
three possible reform agendas proposed in the literature in this regard.
5.2.1. Strengthening the voice of activist shareholders by eliminating
passive fund voting
The first proposal aims to limit or eliminate altogether voting rights of funds
that follow passive index investing strategies.107 Passive fund managers,
arguably, have the weakest incentives to cast informed votes on business
and operating matters and, as a result, their votes may do more harm than
good by silencing the voice of more informed shareholders – primarily,
actively managed funds and hedge fund activists.108 As such, the rights of
activist shareholders and other undiversified institutional investors with inter-
est in firm value maximisation can be strengthened by eliminating passive
fund voting.109
106Anna Christie, ‘The Agency Costs of Sustainable Capitalism: Responsible Activists, Index Investors, and
the Big Three’ (2022 forthcoming) 55 UC Davis L Rev 60–62.
107Lund, n 4 above, at 524–25, 528–30.
108ibid at 510–14.
109See n 5 above.
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The findings of this study do not offer support for this proposal. To the
contrary, this study shows that the differences between fund groups with
predominantly active or passive investment styles in supporting activist
demands are not conclusive.110 Both groups of investors are unlikely to
support hedge fund activists and demands on business and operating
matters on a broad scale (Table 3, Panel B above). Furthermore, some
passive fund groups may be more supportive of activist demands than
active funds (Figure 5 above). More importantly, each group of shareholders
has their own stewardship priorities. Passive fund groups are more focused
on governance and sustainability matters and restrictions on their voting
rights will weaken the diversity of stewardship topics just like overlooking
the role of activist shareholders could reduce the breadth and the depth of
stewardship.
5.2.2. Reforming corporate voting by varying voting rights based on
shareholder nature and interests
The second proposal put forward by Luca Enriques and Alessandro Romano is
more nuanced and addresses the weaknesses of the first proposal by dis-
tinguishing between different contexts in which corporate law can vary the
votes of different types of institutional investors.111 According to this propo-
sal, corporate law voting rules should distinguish between ‘central’ firms that
can generate system-wide externalities for a broad range of stakeholders and
‘peripheral’ firms with limited impact beyond the boundaries of their
business.112 This classification serves as a basis for identifying types of share-
holders that can use stewardship to create the highest value in each context
and amplifying the voice of those shareholders. For example, large diversified
institutional investors have stronger incentives to use stewardship for miti-
gating the risk of negative externalities of central firms and thus need to
have stronger voting rights in central firms.113 By contrast, less diversified
investors benefit from firm-specific value creation and should receive stron-
ger voting rights in peripheral firms where their stewardship efforts are unli-
kely to lead to acute system-wide negative externalities.114 Thus, similar to
the first proposal, corporate law, in addition to share types, must distinguish
shareholder rights based on the nature and investment style of shareholders,
but, instead of a blanket elimination of the voting rights of certain investors,
this proposal aims to amplify the voice of investors based on their relative
advantage in value creation in different contexts. The practical viability of
this model depends on the ability of regulators to define accurately and
110See Section 4.2 above.
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clearly the types of firms and investors, and conditions where firms and inves-
tors move from one to another category.
Alternatively, corporate law can rely on the classification of items voted on
by shareholders to define the types of shareholders that must receive stron-
ger voting rights. Diversified institutional investors could have more say on
matters with system-wide implications, whereas less diversified investors
with actively managed portfolios, which have more to lose from poor man-
agerial decisions on business and operating matters, would receive stronger
voting rights on firm-specific matters. But this model, elegant though it may
be from theoretical perspective, faces several hard questions at the
implementation stage.
One such challenge is the practical difficulty in clearly distinguishing the
types of voting agenda items that have higher value for different shareholder
groups. Given the limited number of matters voted on by shareholders, each
voting item is a leverage that shareholders can use to communicate their pre-
ferences to corporate managers.115 The same voting item can be used by two
different shareholders for communicating different signals in line with the
stewardship preferences of each shareholder. For instance, if director elec-
tions are treated as a business matter voted on only by investors with interest
in firm value maximisation, diversified large investors will lose part of a lever-
age to influence managers and will become weaker stewards.116 Similarly,
treating executive remuneration as a governance matter will weaken the
influence of less diversified investors in promoting their stewardship prefer-
ences. As such, it is not only challenging to classify matters voted on by share-
holders based on their relevance for different shareholder groups, but also
any such classification is likely to weaken the voting power of shareholders
generally.
Another challenge for implementing a corporate law voting model with
varying rights based on shareholder nature and investment styles is related
to voting on fundamental matters. As all shareholders are affected by funda-
mental decisions, such as takeovers or company winding-up decisions, it is
not clear which shareholders (or groups of shareholders) need to receive
stronger voting rights on those matters.
115Indeed, shareholders often use their limited voting rights to send broader signals about their prefer-
ences to the management. For example, low levels of say-on-pay vote approvals can be the result of
protest votes not directly related to executive remuneration. See James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter, and
Randall S. Thomas, ‘The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis and Look
Forward’ (2013) 81 Geo Wash L Rev 967, 992.
116For example, large investment managers have been increasingly relying on director elections to
promote causes such as diversity or climate goals. See Gomtsian, n 2 above, at 696. See also Attracta
Mooney, ‘Fidelity Warns on Climate and Gender Policy’ Fin Times (26 July 2021), at 10 (reporting on the
decision of Fidelity International to vote against directors of more than 1,000 companies if they fail to
address climate change and the lack of gender diversity at corporate boards).
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5.2.3. Promoting a broader range of stewardship topics by
strengthening shareholder rights and lowering regulatory barriers for
shareholder activism
The third proposal, which is more moderate and does not require
radical changes in the established corporate voting model, aims to
promote shareholder activism by strengthening shareholder rights and
lowering barriers for activist campaigns. Conceptually, the proposal is
grounded on two related propositions. First, legal reforms that strengthen
shareholder rights are expected to encourage more activism by providing
shareholders with leverage vis-à-vis corporate managers.117 Second, lowering
regulatory barriers for initiating activist demands should increase the inci-
dence of shareholder activism by reducing the costs of launching an activist
campaign.118
When it comes to regulatory barriers for shareholder activism, one of the
commonly discussed solutions is the reduction of information on beneficial
share ownership by activist investors.119 The UK has one of the most demand-
ing beneficial share ownership disclosure regimes applicable to activist share-
holders among the developed countries.120 These rules discourage hedge
fund activism by revealing activist plans early and thus enabling target man-
agers to design defensive tactics and other shareholders to free ride on acti-
vist efforts.121 In addition to beneficial ownership disclosure rules by activist
shareholders, public companies have the right to identify their shareholders,
regardless of the shareholding size, under the Companies Act 2006.122 The
EU’s Shareholder Rights Directive II introduced similar shareholder identifi-
cation system in 2017.123 This right effectively lowers – and in the case of
the UK Companies Act 2006, removes altogether – the minimum threshold
for the disclosure of beneficial ownership by activists. Although shareholder
identification rules aim to promote direct communications between compa-
nies and their shareholders, they can also be used to detect stakebuilding by
117Cheffins and Armour, n 26 above, at 69.
118Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson, Jr., ‘The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure’ (2012)
2 Harv Bus L Rev 39, 50–51; Strampelli, n 10 above, at 836–41.
119Strampelli, n 10 above, at 838.
120Alexandros Seretakis, ‘Hedge Fund Activism Coming to Europe: Lessons from the American Experi-
ence’ (2014) 8 Brook J Corp Fin & Com L 438, 460–62; Alessio M. Pacces, ‘Hedge Fund Activism and
the Revision of the Shareholder Rights Directive’ (2017) European Corporate Governance Institute,
Law Working Paper No. 353/2017, 19, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2953992; European Securities and
Market Authority, ‘Practical Guide: National Rules on Notifications of Major Holdings Under the Trans-
parency Directive’ (2018) ESMA31-67-535, 77–78, https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
library/practical_guide_major_holdings_notifications_under_transparency_directive.pdf.
121Pacces, n 120 above, at 18–19.
122Companies Act 2006, s 793.
123SRD II, n 70 above, Art 3a(1). According to the directive, Member States shall ensure that companies
have the right to identify their shareholders holding at least 0.5% of company shares. See ibid.
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shareholders,124 thereby creating potential barriers for the efforts of hedge
funds to initiate activist campaigns.125
But it is not straightforward that the overall effect of UK share ownership
disclosure rules is tilting the balance of power against shareholders in inter-
actions with corporate managers. In a recent article, Alexander Platt explains
that share ownership disclosure rules can reduce the costs of shareholder
activism and shareholder proposals by enabling shareholders to identify
target companies with shareholder base supportive of activist demand/pro-
posal topics.126 Ownership transparency also facilitates coordinated engage-
ment by different shareholders.127 Furthermore, risk-decoupling structures in
equity ownership, such as empty voting, which can undermine accountability
in capital markets, flourish where ownership disclosure rules are
inadequate.128 Therefore, weakening disclosure rules cannot be an obvious
solution.
Accordingly, the discussion turns to other measures that can encourage
shareholder activism. As a first step, different forms of shareholder involve-
ment need to be fully integrated into the existing shareholder stewardship
frameworks. One of the distinctive features of the shareholder stewardship
framework in the UK is the assumption that engagement efforts of insti-
tutional investors, but not hedge funds, can promote good corporate govern-
ance practices for the public interest and not merely for the investment
objectives of investors.129 Because of the perceived short-term associations
of hedge fund activism topics, hedge funds are not considered to be an
important element of shareholder stewardship.130 The EU legislator has
adopted a similar model: hedge fund activists are absent from the model
of engagement promoted by the Shareholder Rights Directive II. To the con-
trary, although hedge funds are not mentioned, they are one of the, if not the
primary, target of the directive’s references to negative short-term pressure
on companies.131
124Pacces, n 120 above, at 19; Matteo Gargantini, ‘Article 3A: Identification of Shareholders’ in Hanne
S. Birkmose and Konstantinos Sergakis (eds) The Shareholder Rights Directive II: A Commentary (Chel-
tenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021) 51.
125Pacces, n 120 above, at 19.
126Alexander I. Platt, ‘Beyond “Market Transparency”: Investor Disclosure and Corporate Governance’
(2022 forthcoming) 74 Stan L Rev 29–34, 43–44.
127ibid at 56–57.
128Wolf-Georg Ringe, The Deconstruction of Equity: Activist Shareholders, Decoupled Risk, and Corporate
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 107–10.
129Iris H.-Y. Chiu, The Foundations and Anatomy of Shareholder Activism (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010)
18.
130Bobby V. Reddy, ‘The Emperor’s New Code? Time to Re-Evaluate the Nature of Stewardship Engage-
ment Under the UK’s Stewardship Code’ (2021) MLR 842, 863.
131SRD II, n 70 above, at 3 (claiming that the failure of institutional investors and asset managers to
engage with companies in which they hold shares allows the other participants of capital markets
to exert pressure on the companies to perform in the short term). See also Pacces, n 120 above, at
20 (explaining that the directive does not want hedge fund activism and encourages a different
kind of engagement by institutional investors).
42 S. GOMTSIAN
The established framework ignores different stewardship perspectives that
various groups of shareholders can bring to the table. Regulators need to take
a broader approach to shareholder stewardship and encourage different
groups of shareholders to be active stewards. Governance and sustainability
matters are critical aspects of stewardship and large institutional investors, as
shown in this study, contribute to stewardship over those matters.132 But
stewardship is certainly not limited to those topics: large institutional inves-
tors are less capable in monitoring and engaging over business and operating
matters.133 Therefore, the single-minded emphasis on engagement by insti-
tutional investors needs to be broadened to acknowledge the value
created by different stewardship visions. Hedge fund activists and insti-
tutional investors are not rivals in stewardship; rather, they complement
each other in building stewardship paradigm where different types of share-
holders engage on different matters in line with their incentives and prefer-
ences. Adopting a comprehensive approach to shareholder stewardship is
necessary to prevent regulatory initiatives that come at the expense of
certain types of shareholders.
Additional ways of encouraging shareholder activism can come in the
form of relaxed minimum requirements for sponsoring shareholder propo-
sals. Initiating shareholder proposals is a form of activism that can be used
by hedge funds and other activists to influence corporate decisions and chal-
lenge managers.134 Shareholders of UK-based companies are facing a rela-
tively high threshold of owning at least 5 per cent of the voting shares or
being a group of at least 100 shareholders with each owning no less than
£100 worth shares for sponsoring a proposal.135 These requirements and
the costs associated with shareholder voting campaigns make shareholder
proposals less appealing for a broad range of shareholders, thereby reducing
the list of accessible shareholder activism tools. Indeed, shareholders of UK
companies rarely receive an opportunity to vote on shareholder-sponsored
proposals at the shareholders’ meetings.136
Along with, or instead of, making shareholder proposals more accessible,
the rights of shareholders can be strengthened if companies are required to
consider those proposals more seriously even where the proposals fail
to pass. If shareholder-sponsored proposals fall short of receiving the
minimum votes required for a proposal to pass but nevertheless receive sub-
stantial support from shareholders (for example, at least 20% or 30% of votes
present at a shareholders’ meeting), corporate managers can be required to
132Section 4.1 above.
133ibid.
134Aaron A. Dhir, ‘Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for
Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability’ (2006) Am Bus L J 365, 374.
135Companies Act 2006, s 338(3).
136Gomtsian, n 2 above, at 686.
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include the same item in the agenda of the following meeting or, at
minimum, to communicate the company’s actions in response to the propo-
sal before the next meeting. Such rules can enhance the impact of activists
and assist shareholders in casting more informed votes on management-
sponsored proposals considering the responsiveness of corporate managers
to the preferences of shareholders. Importantly, those reforms, along with
strengthening the impact of activist shareholders, can also contribute
towards the promotion of sustainable goals, for example, by supporting
the ‘say on climate’ initiative.137
Those proposals offer the most adequate ways to exploit the potential
value created by different visions of stewardship because they can encou-
rage various shareholder groups to be active in monitoring and engaging
firms without the risks of disrupting the coherence of the established
model of corporate law voting. Furthermore, unlike weakening disclosure
rules, they are also more pragmatic from the perspective of political
decision-making.
6. Conclusion
This article aims to find out whether activist campaigns inform and broaden
the scope of institutional investor stewardship by analyzing theoretically and
empirically the interactions between activists and institutional investors. The
theoretical analysis shows that large investment managers and most activist
shareholders have different visions of stewardship. These differences limit the
role of activists in informing and thus broadening the scope of stewardship
by institutional investors. Empirical findings confirm that large asset man-
agers do not free ride on the efforts of shareholder activists, especially
hedge funds, to broaden stewardship. Moreover, large asset managers
react to some types of demands, like balance sheet, board related, and
M&A activism, by strengthening the support for the managers of activist tar-
geted firms. Those demands clearly fall outside the range of monitoring,
voting, and engagement preferences of large investment managers. If acti-
vists adapt their demands to those preferences, this will only intensify and
leverage the stewardship efforts of large investment managers within the
existing vision of stewardship, rather than broaden it.
Overall, these findings lead to a key conclusion. Stewardship by large insti-
tutional investors remains limited and rarely benefits from activist campaigns
by enlarging the scope of stewardship. Thus, activist shareholders do not fulfil
the promise of turning rationally apathetic diversified institutional investors
137Matt Wirz, ‘US Firms Resist Activist’s Climate Drive’Wall St J (31 March 2021), at B11 (describing oppo-
sition to an activist campaign by TCI Fund Management to give shareholders a regular vote on carbon
emission targets during annual shareholder meetings); Attracta Mooney and Billy Nauman, ‘Say on
Climate Faces First Big Test as Investor Votes Begin’ Fin Times (18 May 2021), at 11 (the same).
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into active owners beyond governance and sustainability matters. This con-
clusion can be extended across a wide range of institutional investors
because the passive versus active investment style divide plays only a
limited role in the likelihood of supporting activist campaigns. These
findings suggest that large investment managers see clear boundaries for
their stewardship role. Investment managers defer to the board of directors
on defining business direction and on monitoring business and operating
matters; they prefer not to intrude into and duplicate board’s functions,
focusing instead on governance aspects that, in the view of institutional
investors, may improve the performance of the board’s monitoring functions.
This vision of stewardship built around generalised themes is informed by the
traditional governance model of the publicly traded firm and is driven by the
incentives of diversified investors to deal with systematic risks.
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